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ItalyABSTRACT
The paper proposes to use regulatory competition theory in order to better
understand the evolution of the EU member States’ asylum legislation. It argues
that regulatory competition theory can explain the rapid trend of legislative
amendments from the mid-80’s onwards, the progressive yet incomplete
convergence of the EU member States’ legislation, and the spiral of restrictions
of legal norms originally enacted to protect asylum seekers. Competition among
legal norms also explains EU Member States’ reticence to collaborate and share
the burden.
The first argument of the paper is that a phenomenon of competition
developed because Member States were convinced that generous asylum
policies would be a pull factor for asylum seekers. They feared that regulatory
arbitrage (i.e. asylum shopping) would lead asylum seekers to select their
destination State on the basis of the level of protection offered. States have
entered into a process of de-regulation and, because of their interdependence,
national measures have become instruments of a general race to externalise. The
result has turned out to be negative and corresponds to a « race-to-the-bottom ».
This negative result can be observed at two levels : competition was detrimental
to both asylum seekers and States; the rules enacted were suboptimal.
The paper then explains why the first cooperation instruments introduced
at the end of the 80’s and onwards have failed to meet their objective. The
effects of cooperation schemes like the Dublin Convention or burden sharing
projects are negligible and there was no shift from costly and unilateral aylum
policies towards fairer and more efficient collective action. It is an example of
cooperation in the shadow of competition.
Finally the paper evaluates the communautarisation of the competence to
act in the field of asylum. It is unlikely to permit the emergence of a federal and
centralised regulation able to change the nature of the game. In conclusion, the
paper seeks to assess if a good combination of cooperation and competition is
likely to produce « good » asylum policy in Europe and investigates the “co-
opetition” model promoted by Esty and Gerardin.
Keywords: Asylum policy, Regulatory competition, Regulation, Policy
cooperation, Harmonisation.
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of asylum and refugee legislation in Europe from the mid-80’s
onwards is characterised by a substantial decrease in the legal protection granted
to asylum seekers and refugees. Scholars relate the emergence of a “new”
asylum regime that reflects a change in paradigms: whereas before the regime
implemented a selective but integrative policy of access and full status
recognition paired with full social rights, it now maximises exclusion,
undermines status and rights and emphasises short-term stay for refugees (Joly).
During the 80’s and 90’s, numerous legislative amendments were introduced in
a rapid trend culminating in the creation of  so-called “Fortress Europe”. With
the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, EU Member States have set out
cooperative schemes and tried to establish burden sharing mechanisms in order
to put an end to this restrictive spiral. But the trend remains one of restrictive
legal protection.
The paper purports to explain these phenomena using regulatory
competition theory
1 as an analytical framework. This theory may indeed serve as
a complement to sociological, political and economic analyses that all try to
explain evolution in asylum legislation. They stress the importance of political
context (extreme rights movements in Europe for example) or underline the
costs of asylum policy. As for lawyers, they have emphasized the inadequacy of
international legal provisions currently in force to tackle efficiently the problem
of refugees in an era of mass flights and civil wars (Bouteiller-Paquet, 2001).
The paper builds upon these arguments and applies regulatory competition
theory as a complementary perspective. The theory brings additional insights
insofar as it may explain the evolution of legal norms, and sheds new light on
the phenomena of interaction and interdependence among national legislation.
Regulatory competition is defined by Woolcock (1996) as the process in
which regulators deliberately set out to provide a more favourable regulatory
environment, in order either to promote the competitiveness of domestic
industries or to attract more business activity from abroad.  The concept is
imported from Tiebout’s theory (1956) which set out a model of local
governments in which different levels of service or taxation coexisted with
residents changing location to choose the pattern they individually preferred.
The model was based on the principle that consumers would ‘vote with their
feet’ by moving to another locality if they did not like the combination of public
services and taxes offered. As a result, local governments would tend to allocate
resources in a pareto-efficient way. Despite the numerous criticisms levelled at
                                                         
1 The paper will consider that “regulatory competition”, “competition among rules”,
“competition among legislation”, “locational competition” and “interjurisdictional
competition” are different terms describing the same reality.2
Tiebout’s system, regulatory competition theory has been used to explain the
American experience with corporate chartering. Setting national regulations by
taking into account their impact on the flow of internationally mobile goods,
services or factors and, in turn, on national economic activity is said to lead to a
form of arbitrage by economic actors across the different opportunities provided
by the market.  Regulators are responsive to mobile factors’ demands and will
modify their legal framework in order to attract larger shares of mobile factors,
hence the appearance of a regulation spiral. Indeed, the American States have
competed for incorporations by offering corporation friendly chartering
requirements. Because the race was won by the State of Delaware, the idea that
regulatory competition develops a deregulatory dynamic has been dubbed the
Delaware effect (See Romano, 1985).
Regulatory competition theory does not overlook the potential
shortcomings of the competitive process.  First, competition cannot per se cope
with nor avoid market failures, among which externalities: States’ activities
often produce effects on other States. Second of all, the benefits of regulatory
competition must be weighed against the potential undermining of welfare
States should mobile factors of production (capital, companies) be competed for
as opposed to less mobile factors (labour). In the same vein high transaction
costs can also be mentioned insofar as frequent changes in regulation can
generate important transaction costs for regulators and the regulated industry
(adjustments costs supported by business). Finally, debates have focused on the
result of regulatory competition. In the wake of the Delaware debate, risks of
competitive deregulation and a “race to the bottom” in regulation have been
underlined: if one regulator decides to introduce lower or lax corporation taxes
in order to attract investments and succeeds, the other regulators will compete
and reduce taxes as well. Reduced taxation decreases the ability of governments
to provide public goods and the result is said to be sub-optimal. Opponents of
this conclusion have tried to demonstrate that instead, in certain cases and
circumstances, a race to the top might occur (California effect). Indeed, in order
to attract new investors, States must be able to offer public goods of high
standards, such as infrastructure, educated labour, stability etc.
The paper proposes to use regulatory competition theory in order to better
understand the evolution of the EU member States’ asylum legislation. It argues
that regulatory competition theory can explain the rapid trend of legislative
amendments from the mid-80’s onwards, the progressive yet incomplete
convergence of the EU member States’ legislation, and the spiral of restrictions
of legal norms originally enacted to protect asylum seekers. Competition among
legal norms also explains EU Member States’ reticence to collaborate and share
the burden.
3
The first argument of the paper is that a phenomenon of competition
developed because Member States were convinced that generous asylum
policies would be a pull factor for asylum seekers. They feared that regulatory
arbitrage (i.e. asylum shopping) would lead asylum seekers to select their
destination State on the basis of the level of protection offered (Part 1). States
have entered into a process of de-regulation and, because of their
interdependence, national measures have become instruments of a general race
to externalise (Part 2). The result has turned out to be negative and corresponds
to a «  race-to-the-bottom  » (Part 3). The final Part explains why the first
cooperation instruments introduced at the end of the 80’s and onwards have
failed to meet their objective. The final remarks seek to assess if a good
combination of cooperation and competition is likely to produce «  good  »
asylum policy in Europe. (Part 4).
PART I - WHY DID REGULATORY COMPETITION START?
EVIDENCE OR THREAT OF ASYLUM SHOPPING
In regulatory competition theory, the origin of competition among rules is
economic actors’ responsiveness to differences in regulation. This
responsiveness, called forum shopping or regulatory arbitrage, is the action
undertaken by market operators to select the best location for investments or
economic activity on the basis of the local regulatory environment (Woolcock,
1996, p. 298). In the field of asylum, competition developed because States were
convinced that asylum seekers were rational actors, acting as law consumers i.e.
selecting as a destination the State offering the highest level of protection
(opportunity to be granted the refugee status, rights of residence, to work,
subsidies, social security etc.). The following will show that the threat of asylum
shopping
2 became part of political rhetoric (Section 1). This perception is not
rooted in empirical evidence but is based on the specificity of asylum. Asylum
seekers are by nature mobile actors, and the legal framework favours their
capacity to act as forum shoppers. Therefore, while forum shopping is arguable
in certain areas, it is highly plausible in the field of asylum (Section 2).
Section 1. The threat of asylum shopping
There is a debate among scholars on the very existence of asylum shopping. Yet
an analysis of statistical data describing the evolution of the number of asylum
applications in Europe gives evidence of the existence of asylum shopping. Data
                                                         
2 The terminology “asylum shopping” is used to describe two different realities. The first one,
that tends to be dominant in political debates, refers to the fact that people lodge multiple
asylum applications in several States, thus “abusing” the asylum system. The paper uses the
second meaning : asylum shopping is the comparison and selection of one asylum rule among
several.4
provided by the UNHCR (UNHCR, 1999) point to the conclusion that, during
the 80’s and the 90’s, asylum seekers modified their choices as a consequence of
restrictive amendments to asylum law in a given European country. One can
evidence a correlation between restrictive legislation amendment year t and the
significant decrease of asylum applications year t+1
3.
Spain and Germany are two significant examples. From 1983 to 1992, the
number of asylum applications lodged in Germany increased every year
4 (with
one exception: 1987) and reached the level of 438 190 applications in 1993. It is
exactly at this moment that the German Constitution and law were modified
restrictively. The following year, the total number of asylum applications
dropped from 438 190 to 127 211. After that date, the number of asylum
applications went on decreasing: 116 370 in 1996, 98 640 in 1998 etc.  In Spain,
a major restrictive amendment was introduced in 1994. Before Spain abandoned
its liberal legislation, the number of asylum applications was on the increase
every year, from a very small number in the 80’s (one or two thousand) to 12
620 in 1993 and 11 990 in 1994. But in 1995, the number of asylum applications
dropped to 5680 and then oscillated between 4730 (1996) and 8410 (1998). The
same evidence can be given for France (legislative amendment in 1991, decrease
in the number of applications in 1992), Sweden (years 1992-1993), and the
Netherlands (years 1994-1995). On the basis of these data, it is possible to argue
that asylum seekers are informed of legislative amendment and reorient their
choice after a restrictive change. Rotte et al. (Rotte, 1996) who have analysed
the cases of Germany and France conclude that changes in law significantly
influence asylum migration.
But there is not widespread agreement on the existence of asylum
shopping. The major counter-argument to the existence of asylum shopping is
that asylum seekers are not “normal” migrants. A report in 1997 (Backer and
Havinga, 1997) stresses the fact that, where protection seekers “end up depends
mostly on how quickly they fled and by which means (…) most have little
previous knowledge of regulations about work or welfare support.” A second
criticism of the asylum shopping hypothesis is as follows: legal norms and the
rights they grant are not the unique levers of the choice of a destination State.
Many pull and push factors influence the choice of a destination: presence of
family members, national communities, language spoken, financial networks
etc. Expected legal rights are only one among many criteria that trigger the
decision (See Rotte et al.). Therefore, when a State restrictively amends its
                                                         
3 Certainly, asylum seekers do not only react to changes in legislation. An increase in the
number of asylum applications can be explained by the outbreak of a war, sudden political
repression in a country etc. Therefore, the increase is considered to be significant in one
country only in comparison with neighbouring countries.
4 From 19 740 in 1983, to 438 190 in 1992.
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asylum legislation, only some asylum seekers modify their choice. The reality of
regulatory arbitrage can be questioned: it might be a weaker factor than
expected.
Yet analyses of public opinion have evidenced that in many States,
populations fear an “invasion” of refugees if national legislation is too
welcoming. Even in countries which have, comparatively speaking, strict laws,
governments may esteem that controls are too lax and that the State is carrying
all the burden of refugees in Europe. States now publicly voice their concern
that favourable conditions in one country might create an «  in draught  »
(Bouteiller-Paquet, p. 176). Very recently, British Home Office Minister Bob
Answorth indicated that the adoption of common minimum standards under
debate in the EU “will help to deter asylum shopping”
5. The asylum shopping
argument is now predominant in political debates, as illustrated in the Sangatte
case. In the same vein, current efforts to harmonise refugee law provisions in the
EU are generally justified by the desire to eliminate the differences in levels of
protection among legislation that feed asylum shopping
6.
This situation recalls the political debate on social dumping. Barnard
(2000) shows that regulatory arbitrage among European social legislation is
unlikely because businesses are not relocating on a large scale. Social dumping
has proven to be more of a term of political abuse than a description of
economic reality. It became part of political rhetoric, convenient for the left and
the right. It can be argued that a comparable phenomenon has occurred in the
field of asylum. Asylum shopping probably explains some migration but is
unable to fully explain States’ decisions to enact new regulations. Rather, it is
the perceived threat of huge flows of migrants entering their territories that gave
member States an incentive to adapt their legislation following the example of
their direct competitors, just as in the Delaware competition the prospect of
reincorporation made host countries lax their standards.
Section 2. Explanation of the threat: “Asylum shopping” is plausible
Asylum shopping is plausible for two reasons.
The first condition of regulatory arbitrage is the existence of a “market of
legal norms”: legal products in competition must be “alternative products” for
                                                         
5 Quoted in 10 Downing Street Newsroom, http://www. number-10.gov.uk
6 The Working Paper “Revisting Dublin” concludes that the Common European Asylum
system will reduce the differences between member States which may influence the
distribution pattern of asylum applications within the EU. It admits that, as substantive
asylum laws have not yet been approximated, “it is no surprise that people in need of
international protection find one member State a more attractive destination than another”
SEC (2000)522 final of  March 21
st, 2000.6
law shoppers. This condition is met in the case of asylum. All Member States
have legislation regulating the conditions for being granted the status of refugee,
asylum procedure and the rights conferred upon refugees (right of work,
residence, social subsidies, right to family reunification etc). The fifteen asylum
legislation are alternative products insofar as they are both different and
equivalent in their function (granting protection to people fearing persecution,
implementation of the non-refoulement principle
7). The latter characteristic must
be emphasized: it indicates that, for regulatory arbitrage to exist, a good balance
must exist between similarities and differences in national legislation.
But, in actual fact, even the existence of different legal products is not
sufficient to trigger asylum shopping. Forum shopping also requires that
information be provided or at least accessible to the potential arbiters. It is the
same condition as Tiebout’s “full knowledge of each jurisdiction’s revenue and
expenditure patterns”. To suggest as much seems rather provocative in view of
the circumstances in which asylum is requested: it seems doubtful that people
fleeing persecution would have access to the rules, compare them and select the
country or destination on the basis of a better treatment to be expected in one
country as opposed to another. But the UNHCR concludes that asylum seekers
are usually skilled people, guided by “readily available information about other
places and available opportunities, cheaper and accessible transportation
facilities and available services of professional migration agents assisting with
travel arrangements and documentation” (UNHCR, 2000, p. 3). In addition,
sociological studies show that many asylum seekers have access to information,
in particular when they travel by a transit State before entering onto the
European States’ territories. They also stress the capacity of smuggling networks
to review legal rules and inform asylum seekers (See Chatelard, 2002).
Asylum shopping is plausible for a second reason as suggested by the
comparison with regulatory arbitrage in company law or social law. In these
fields, scholars have raised doubts (See Deakins for company law, Barnard for
social law) as to the existence of regulatory competition among EU member
States. Their main explanation lies in the absence of material possibility to
arbitrate: law merchants can be arbiters only if they have the legal capacity to
move and change jurisdiction according to their preferences. The competition
among American States for incorporations was indeed partly driven by the
United States’ conflict of laws principle that sets out that incorporators are free
to choose the State of incorporation and thereby to choose the law applicable to
the corporation’s internal affaires (Trachtman, p. 60). Following Tiebout’s
theory, there must be full mobility of people and resources at little or no cost, a
                                                         
7 All member States have ratified the Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocol of New
York, 1967. They are all bound by the European Convention on Human rights as interpreted
by the European Court on Human rights. Thus, a minimum common denominator exists.
7
condition that is unfulfilled as far as European companies are concerned (See
Mac Gowan and Seabright, 1995). Indeed, companies hesitate to relocate
because of reincorporating costs, and many legal conditions hinder their
mobility. Deakin shows (2000) the absence of an effective European market for
incorporations. The possibility of a market for incorporations has been blocked,
in part, by the operation of national-level rules of conflict of laws which limit
the degree to which companies can choose its applicable law – (i.e.) the so-
called siège réel doctrine. The mechanisms of corporate and exit which, in the
US context, brought the corporate law systems of the States directly into
competition with each other, simply do not exist within the EU. Trachtman
(1993, p. 60) concludes that the principle according to which economic actors
are free to choose the law applicable does not exist under most civil law
jurisdictions.
For asylum, the context is different. The argument that mobility is too
costly is not pertinent in the case of asylum seekers simply because they are
forced to move. Asylum seekers may have no choice but to “vote with their
feet” (the UNHCR 2000, p. 5) and high costs of mobility are meaningless. The
achievement of the internal market facilitates their mobility in the EU. Once an
asylum seeker has reached the territory of a member State, secondary migration
is greatly facilitated by the removal of the European internal borders.
Certainly a State can impede access to refugee protection: in practice,
States have erected barriers to prevent asylum seekers from accessing their
protection by impeding entrance onto national territory. But despite States’
efforts, in fact asylum seekers frequently manage to reach the State where they
want to ask protection. The erection of new controls and borders has failed to
stop migration. Instead, it has transformed legal entries into clandestine arrivals.
Nor can an asylum seeker be condemned for having entered a member State
without legal documents according to the Geneva Convention. Last but not least,
once an asylum seeker has lodged an application on a State’s territory, and,
therefore, freely accessed a system of protection, the Geneva Convention forbids
States to resort to expulsion or repatriation according to the principle of non
refoulement that it sets out
8.
Therefore, insofar as regulatory arbitrage is concerned - i.e. selection of a
destination State on the basis of the legal treatment to be expected - the
hypothesis according to which the asylum field is specific is highly plausible.
Mobility is the essence of any type of migration and is facilitated by the
international legal norms on refugee and asylum seekers.
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PART II- EXPLANATION OF RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION
AMENDMENTS: STRATEGIC DE-REGULATION  AND THE RACE
TO EXTERNALISE
The process of competition among legislation is a three-step game. It is
triggered by regulatory arbitrage. The Delaware example shows that the
response of companies and investors is crucial for the operation of competition
because they are the media through which this very competition takes place
(Woolcock, p. 305). Then, when regulators (States) realise that companies or
investors are changing jurisdiction, they will decide to change their laws.
Competition starts when States are responsive to law merchants’ preferences.
The third step takes place when States enter into competition with each other
and begin to implement strategic measures i.e. measures aimed at being
competitive in comparison to the other member States’ rules.
The paper now purports to evidence the development of competition
among member States’ asylum legislation. It shows that States have been
responsive to asylum seekers’ preferences (Section 1) and have enacted strategic
regulation (Section 2). These laws have produced externalities and a process that
can be described as a race to externalise (Section 3).
Section 1. Regulators’ responsiveness to factor movements
Correlation between the increase of asylum applications year t and law
amendment year t+1 (See UNHCR statistical data, 1999) suggests that States
have reacted to asylum seekers’ migration. Germany modified its law (including
its Constitution) in 1993, just some months after what was to become the peak
of its asylum application growth curve (more than 438 109 applications in
1992). The same correlation between net growth of applicants and drastic
amendment appears in Spain in 1993 and in Portugal in 1994. These examples
are especially relevant because the three States in question not only modified
their legislation but also their Constitutions. It is the whole national legal system
of protection that was restrictively modified in order to reduce the costs implied
by a generous asylum policy.
Of course States’ adaptation to law consumers’ preferences took on here a
specific form. Whereas in the Delaware model States enacted attractive
regulation for companies, in the field of asylum it will be shown that the goal
was just the opposite, i.e. to take in as few refugees as possible. It follows then
that States reacted to consumers’ demands by enacting legislation aiming at
repelling them or preventing them from accessing refugee protection.   
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Firstly, States introduced a wide range of measures related to the arrival
and admission of people wishing to claim refugee status onto their territory.
They implemented measures impeding or making extremely difficult the entry
onto national territory: reinforcement of border controls, visa requirements (for
entry and transit), creation of international zones in ports or airports, the fining
of airlines or shipping companies transporting undocumented people, the posting
of liaison officers in countries of origin or transit, etc. These measures are
rightly called “non entrée measures”. In addition, all member States introduced
into national law the «  safe third country  » and «  manifestly unfounded
application » techniques, complemented by readmission agreements with third
countries. A person coming from a safe third country will not have access to the
status of refugee and will generally be refused the right of entry onto national
territory. The concept of manifestly unfounded application justifies the
curtailing of the examination procedure, limits procedural rights and guarantees
and can lead to the total refusal to grant refugee status. These deflecting
measures are purported to contain asylum seekers outside Europe, mainly in
States surrounding the persecuting State. Traditional transit countries, States
such as Turkey, Iran, Jordan, and the CEECs, have become final destination
countries as a result of restrictive EU member States’ policies and indeed have
been encouraged to come together to form a buffer-zone for the EU via political,
diplomatic and economic incentives (see the UNHCR, Lavenex, Chatelard).
Secondly, one can canvass examples of many legislative amendments that
have restricted the rights granted to people enjoying refugee status (right to
work, social subsidies etc) or to people whose asylum applications are under
examination (right to housing or to work, access to training and education for
children etc.) States have also favoured measures of temporary stay, and
therefore introduced a qualitatively different approach, which negates the
premise of the Geneva Convention (See Joly). States have also developed
measures favouring return and done away with all measures favouring
integration in the host society. These various measures implemented over the
course of only a few years were a signal to asylum seekers: the latter were
nudged towards reorienting their choice of one State to another.
Thirdly, States have limited the access to refugee protection. Observers
have noted a growing tendency to interpret the criteria for refugee status in an
increasingly restrictive manner. Higher standards of proof of persecution are
being imposed, the only recognised agent of persecution is the State and
applications of asylum seekers coming from countries where so-called internal
flight alternatives exist may be rejected. Instead of a universal definition of
people fearing persecution, negative, and more exceptionally, positive group
determination is frequently adopted. Countries in which there is generally no
serious risk of persecution are added to national lists of so-called safe countries,10
and nationals of these States often confront the presumption that their claim is
unfounded when they apply for asylum (Joly, p. 344).
States have also implemented new forms of protection, called
humanitarian, territorial or de facto status and frequently promoted by the
UNHCR. These statuses confer legal rights upon persons who fall outside the
scope of the Geneva Convention and are thus unable to enjoy the refugee status.
This complementary protection grants protection to persons fleeing civil war
(Duldung in Germany, F status in Denmark, Exceptional leave to remain in the
UK), who are victims of persecution by non-State actors (territorial asylum in
France), who are victims of persecution founded on their sexual orientation
(Sweden). Interestingly, States have adopted this mechanism with little
reticence, although at first glance they increase the number of people likely to
enjoy protection under their jurisdiction. But this apparent generosity must not
conceal the real aims.  The de facto status are less protective than the status of
refugee (the rights conferred are limited, the protection generally temporary). In
reality, de facto statuses are part of a strategy to reduce protection costs when a
person can not be repatriated. In addition, States have complete autonomy with
regards to granting or refusing these statuses. Therefore, States have accepted
new forms of protection in order to internalise the constraints of protection, and
to avoid Geneva Convention obligations
9.  It ensues from all of the above that
Member States have been extremely reactive to asylum seekers’ preferences.
Limiting legal protection was a reaction to the increase in the number of asylum
applications and was purported to prevent and/or dissuade asylum seekers from
entering onto national soil. At the same time, the measures were adapted with
reference to the other competitors’ rules. Indeed, each piece of legislation can be
seen as partaking in a strategy of  de-regulation necessitated by a competitive
environment.
Section 2. Strategic deregulation
Analysing the determining factors of asylum seeker inflows in Germany and
France during the period 1985-1994, Rotte et al (1996) conclude that between
the asylum policies of both countries a clearly relevant degree of
interdependence exists. They show that French law reform in 1991 resulted in
the rerouting and subsequent increase in the number of asylum seekers going to
Germany. In the same vein, France saw a rise in the number of asylum
applications due to toughened German regulation. Other examples can be
provided. When Germany amended its Constitution, the Netherlands and the UK
became the recipients of the asylum seekers previously going to Germany. The
                                                         
9 Germany, for example, when modifying its constitution in 1993, created at the same time a
specific status for civil war refugees. This legal status, entirely organised by the legislator,
forbids its beneficiaries to apply for the status of refugee (See Ablard and Novak, 1995).
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Netherlands received 35 400 asylum applications in 1993 and 52 570 in 1994. In
the UK, the number of applications also increased from 1994 to 1996.
Unsurprisingly in 1996, it was Great Britain’s turn to enact  restrictive
legislation (introduction of the notion of safe third country into national
immigration law).
The argument is that, because Member States are part of a Union and
share common borders, they are interdependant and their legislation interact. A
comparative analysis of asylum law amendments reveals very interesting
interactions among legislation.
First,  tere is a striking simultaneity in the enactment of law amendments.
All member States modified their refugee and asylum law by the mid-80’s.
Moreover, it is significant that the five EU member States which traditionally
granted a right to asylum in their constitution
10  (France, Germany, Spain,
Portugal, Italy) (See Jeannin et al.) restrictively modified their constitutional
provisions in 1993 and 1994. They all  transformed the previous right to asylum
into a right to ask for asylum, in other words what was before a right has
become a favour granted by sovereign States. In Germany, asylum remains a
subjective right but it is no longer absolute: the German legislator has been
constitutionally empowered to draw up lists determining which countries of
origin or transit are to be considered as ‘safe’.
In Portugal 
11, the law of September 29
th, 1993 has given the State power
to grant or refuse asylum
12.  In France, the Constitution
13 was changed in 1993
14,
and what was an obligation to grant asylum has become a simple faculty for the
State to give protection (See Picard, 1994, p. 166). In Spain
15, a 1994 reform
abolished the difference between constitutional and conventional asylum. The
elimination of the constitutional right to asylum was the first step in a general
                                                         
10 This so-called ‘constitutional asylum’ is a right conferred upon specific categories of
people (usually people fearing persecution for their political activity in their country of origin)
and directly granted by national constitutional norms. It is different from the right granted in
application of the Geneva Convention.
11 Before the 1982 amendment, asylum was granted to foreigners and Stateless people
persecuted or fearing persecution for their action in favour of democracy, social or national
liberation, peace among peoples, freedom and human rights.
12 Article 4-2 States that asylum can be refused on the grounds of external or domestic
security, which include the socio-economic situation of the country.
13 Following the preamble of the Constitution of 1946, people fearing persecution for their
action in favour of freedom have a right to asylum on the territories of the Republic.
14 Article 53-1 al. 2  : when France is not held responsible for asylum application (in
application of the Schengen criteria), the French authorities can grant asylum to any foreigner
persecuted for his/her action in favour of the freedom.
15 The right to asylum was recognised by article 13-4.12
move to decrease protection (See Jeannin et al). Officially, France and Spain
changed their constitutional provisions in order to comply with the Schengen
Convention. But this argument is not convincing because the Schengen
Convention did not impose on member States the abolition or the amendment of
constitutional rights to asylum. In reality, regulatory competition is a better
explanation. The existence of a favorable constitutional status alone was a pull
factor for protection shoppers who did not fulfil the conditions required by the
Geneva Convention.
A second clue pointing to interactions among asylum legislation is the
evidence of chain amendments: if one State introduced a restrictive
modification, his competitors would quickly follow suit and modify their law by
“copying and pasting” the innovative legal techniques invented by the first
mover. Three sets of techniques, invented in one country and then copied by the
others, are particularly significant. The first took the form of sanctions imposed
on carriers transporting improperly documented passengers. Initially conceived
of by Danish law in 1983, the measure was then imported by Germany, the UK
and Belgium in 1987 and introduced into their legal orders only to then be
incorporated into the Schengen Convention in 1990. Logically then all other
member States have copied the technique that consists of decentralising and
privatising border controls (Cruz, 1995). The second example concerns the
creation of international or transit zones in airports and ports. The goal is to
avoid the official entry onto national soil that triggers a State’s responsibility
vis-à-vis asylum seekers. France introduced the system in 1992, and then Italy a
few months later, then Germany, in 1993, and Spain, in 1994, copied the
technique, rapidly followed by the majority of the member States of the EU. A
third convergent evolution in member States’ legislation was the incorporation
of two complementary concepts: “safe third country” and “manifestly
unfounded application”. Germany introduced these notions into its legal order in
1993 and then all member States enacted provisions enhancing them.
These three examples tend to confirm that, in keeping with regulatory
competition theory, the competitive process has favoured a natural, albeit very
incomplete, approximation of  national asylum laws. It also reveals that States’
legislation were in permanent interaction.
Section 3. A race to externalise
The interdependance among national legislation can be explained in two ways.
One may consider that States’ laws have generated non internalised regulatory
externalities imposed upon their competitors. According to this view when
national regulators enacted laws they failed to take into account the resulting
international consequences. The uncontrolled creation of non internalised
13
negative externalities is, in competition theory, a sign of market failure and
inefficient competition.
A second and more convincing hypothesis is that, in the field of asylum,
competition has taken the form of deliberate use of national regulations as a
strategic weapon in international competition and in which one country’s gains
become the others’ costs (See Gatsios and Seabright, 1989). Indeed, because
new national legislation was aimed at further reducing asylum migration, the
competition became a general race among «  diversion policies  » designed to
shift to other States the responsibility of taking in asylum applicants (UNHCR,
2000  ; Landgren, 1999). The new legislation contained a potential for
“devaluation races” in asylum law among Western countries. Rotte et al suggest
that States have used beggar-thy-neighbour effects in this field (Rotte et al,
1996).
To be true, one may argue that the policy of externalisation towards non
member States is not related to regulatory competition among member States.
Yet the first States to have adopted diversion measures could then claim a first
mover advantage. It is striking that all the externalisation legal techniques (the
safe third country notion and readmission agreements, the ‘manifestly
unfounded application’ concept, the posting of liaison officers in ports and
airports of transit countries, the financial incentives for transit countries to
reinforce their border controls etc), once invented and created in one member
State, were then copied by the others in a rapid trend.
Certainly, competition among rules was not perfect, as it did not involve
all participants at the same time. The redirection of asylum seekers to the UK
and the Netherlands in 1994 clearly indicates that not all member States became
recipients of protection seekers previously hosted in Germany. This can be
accounted for by the fact that asylum shopping is not simply based on legislation
differences. Other pull factors influence the choice of a potential destination: the
language spoken, national communities, family ties etc. may limit the size of the
market. In addition, geographical proximity, legal agreements facilitating border
crossing may influence significantly the transfer from choice A to choice B
when State A modifies its legislation. Cluster competition is therefore much
more likely to exist than perfect competition. This indicates that competition
among national asylum laws, although it was not a perfect game, was a process,
a dynamic that States had to come to terms with and indeed chose to reinforce
by their strategic actions.14
PART III- EVALUATION OF THE SPIRAL OF RESTRICTIONS IN
LEGAL PROTECTION: A “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”
There is a debate with regards to the result of regulatory competition. For
scholars like Romano (1985) or Charny (1991), competition among rules
produces optimal and innovative legislation: it creates a “race to the top”
because it ensures the production of laws distinguishable by their capacity to
enhance shareholder welfare (See also Trachtman, 1993; Winter, 1997). But
many scholars disagree with this conclusion. Competition can be deleterious
when States are penalising the less mobile factors, such as workers, by reducing,
for instance, employment protection legislation in order to remain attractive to
the more mobile factors such as capital. For Cary (1974), one of the main critics
of the Delaware model, competition is not efficient because managers will
choose to incorporate in the State where the corporation laws are efficient but
only from their point of view: they disregard shareholders’ interests. Therefore a
“race to the bottom” is said to occur when businesses move in response to
negative deregulation designed to attract capital by lowering social protection.
The competition creates a spiral of restrictions from which, in the long run, no
State can emerge victorious.
In regulatory competition literature, two criteria serve to determine the
result of competition. First of all, the effect of competition on the game
participants’ welfare. Second of all, the capacity of regulatory competition to
produce optimal rules. With regards to both criteria, I propose to conclude that,
in the field of asylum, regulatory competition has produced a negative result
16:
competition has generated a spiral of restrictions in legal protection which is
problematic both for asylum seekers and for States (Section 1). In addition the
rules enacted are sub-optimal (Section 2).
Section 1. The restriction in legal protection is detrimental to both asylum
seekers and States
Using a law and economics perspective, the supporters of the Delaware model
of the competition for incorporation consider that the market for shareholder
investment will discipline managers in their choice of jurisdiction, so that the
jurisdiction that provides the most efficient law contract between management
and shareholders will be selected. The argument is that shareholders are able to
identify the costs being allocated to them by virtue of applicable State
corporation law and to coalesce into effective action to avoid these costs.
Shareholders may lobby State legislatures against « lax » corporate laws, or they
                                                         
16 The terminology has also entered political discourse. For instance, Belgium’s Minister,
Antoine Dusquene, has mentioned the necessity to “put an end to negative competition
between member States’, See Agence Europe, 17/09/1999.
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may seek to influence corporations directly, encouraging them not to incorporate
or reincorporate in States with lax corporate laws. To put it differently, the race
to the top argument is rooted in the conviction that shareholders are a
countervailing force against management’s interests in laxity. Critics of the
Delaware model espouse the view that the balance of power tips in favour of the
managers rather than the shareholders as the former can make independent
choices regarding the jurisdiction of incorporation and that the market for shares
is inadequately effective as far as disciplining managers goes.
The focus on shareholders’ and managers’ situation, which serves to
evaluate the result of competition, is mainly based on a costs and benefits
analysis. I propose to use this costs and benefits analysis and apply it to each
participant of the game and have come to the conclusion that competition is
negative because it has undermined both asylum seekers’ (§1) and States’ (§2)
welfare.
§1. The degradation of the asylum seekers’ situation
The shift from generous asylum laws to restrictive measures has been presented
in the previous part. It is important now to evaluate its consequences.
First, States have implemented “non arrival” measures, aimed at
containing asylum seekers outside of Europe and/or to redirecting them towards
other member States. The UNHCR considers that these non entrée measures
have jeopardised the security of potential and actual asylum seekers (UNHCR,
1997). These procedures impede access to a territory and have obstructed the
flight of people whose fear of persecution in their country of origin is genuinely
founded and who are unable or unlikely to obtain refuge in a neighbouring State.
The UNHCR shows that through the implementation of safe third country and
manifestly unfounded application measures, asylum seekers are bounced from
country to country until one finally decides to host them. This chain deportation
phenomenon adds to the psychological and physical wear and burdens of an
already fragile population.
As seen above, States have also limited the access to refugee status. To
that end, some States have chosen a very narrow interpretation of the Geneva
definition of “refugee”. The most significant example is the refusal to grant the
status of refugee to people who are victims of persecution by non State actors or
who are fleeing civil wars. But because they are bound by international
obligations such as the non-refoulement principle set out in the Geneva
Convention and Article 3 of the ECHR, States frequently cannot resort to
expatriation. As a result many people can neither be granted refugee status nor
can they be returned to a third country. They therefore live in a legal limbo, with16
no protection and no possibility to fully integrate into the host society.  In some
cases, people will be able to manage to access a de facto status, but the latter
provides limited rights, and grants only temporary stay in poor conditions. The
situation is not so different for people who are ‘fortunate’ enough to be granted
the Geneva status. NGOs and the UNHCR observe that the procedure for the
examination of asylum applications is extremely long. They indicate that such
lengthy procedures are problematic because, before their asylum application is
fully examined and a status granted or refused, asylum seekers live without
subsidies.
Finally, many States have reduced the number of rights conferred upon
asylum seekers who are already caught up in the asylum procedure, like the right
to work and social protection. One can point to practices such as the withdrawal
of social welfare and legal aid entitlements, or the restriction of the right to an
education. Joly (1999) rightly concludes that asylum seekers suffer from a
negative presumption. They are considered guilty until they prove themselves
innocent (of having committed a fraud). A program of non-integration implicitly
underpins the measures applied: if, in the end, they are granted protection, it is
almost despite identity or travel documents. As a result, a marginalised group in
a semi-legal situation is created.  
§2. The costs of competition for States
From the States’ point of view, competition was also a costly game and
competitiveness has required permanent and far too laborious efforts.
First of all, the competitive process imposed frequent legislative changes,
and constitutional amendment. In some cases, States amended their legislation
every year, which represents important costs in relation to the legislative
procedure, time spent by members of parliament, the involvement of
government and civil, as well as the costs of implementation of the new law.
Second of all, the deflection costs have been extremely important and
probably excessive. By putting the accent on migration control and border
protection, regulators have used a very high level of human resources (custom,
police, and civil servants in charge of asylum application examination). The
volume of administrative procedures regulating access to national territory and
organising border controls has constantly increased. As the UNHCR States,
(UNHCR 1997, p. 196) “in attempting to limit the number of asylum seekers
arriving and remaining on their territory, these States have actually damaged
their own interests”. Moreover, the systems developed to reduce the costs have
created new costs. The chain deportation system generated by the
implementation of safe third country techniques has required new technical
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means and resources, precisely the opposite result of the countries’ goal (see
ECRE 1995).
To tell the truth, the deflection costs were not uniquely caused by
competition. The shift from generous to restrictive asylum policy is attributable
to the eruption of important conflicts that led to mass refugee movement and the
subsequent massive increase in the number of asylum seekers in Europe. Yet
because States unilaterally implemented deterrent measures and initiated a
competitive game, their deflecting measures rapidly became inefficient. They
constantly had to readapt their legislation in order to remain competitive. To this
aim, they were obliged to further and further enhance the deflection effect of
their policy in order to outdo their rivals.
Thirdly, competition generated practices that became costly for States’
international reputation. Part of their international image and the benefits gained
from hosting refugees is to be able to tout themselves as human rights
protectors. The development of restrictive measures unsurprisingly damaged
their reputation and States now face problems of legitimacy in certain arenas.
Moreover, the UNHCR (UNHCR, 1997, p.69) notes that, when the very
countries responsible for establishing the international refugee regime begin to
challenge its legal and ethical foundations, “then it is hardly surprising that other
States, especially those with far more economic problems and much larger
refugee populations, have decided to follow suit. (…) Increasingly, when low-
income countries close their borders to refugees, they tend to justify their actions
by referring to the precedents which have already been set by the more affluent
States”. Moreover, the degradation of refugee protection in third world countries
impacts on member States’ asylum policies. When transit countries refuse to
sign or ratify the Geneva Convention or grant only limited protection to
refugees, European countries cannot consider them to be “safe” and therefore
cannot make use of the safe third country technique. Indeed the efficiency of
their deflecting measures is challenged by their very own policies.
At a collective level, the result of competition is also sub-optimal.
Numerous studies (Noll, 2000; UNHCR, 1999) highlight sharp differences in the
allocation of asylum seekers and refugees. Whether the study is carried out by
examining the number of refugees per country, the ratio GNP/number of
refugees, or the ratio population/number of refugees, whatever the period
considered, some member States carry a heavier burden than others (Betts,
2002; Vink, 2002). In itself, the difference is not necessarily problematic. Betts
(2002) shows that States can receive private benefits in hosting refugees.
Generosity in the reception of refugees might be justified by internal
motivations: history, perception of a duty to protect human rights, labour market
needs etc may explain differences in national reception policies.18
Yet, from the mid-80’s onwards, the perception that a generous asylum
policy was beneficial decreased as the number of asylum seekers dramatically
increased in Europe. As a consequence, States started comparing their policies,
and the main reception countries began to point to the imbalance and insist upon
the need for burden sharing schemes. The pursuit of unilateral actions and
indifference towards the plight of other member States started to jeopardise
other EU objectives and policies (Barbou des Places, 2002). A non-burden
sharing strategy is likely to impact on other fields of European integration, such
as the general achievement of the internal market, the progressive establishment
of a migration policy, including the Dublin and Schengen systems. In the
absence of equitable allocation of refugees, overburdened States may come to
reconsider border control collaboration or delay the adoption of regulations in
other fields (economic and social cohesion for example). In addition,
unevenness in the reception of refugees raises the question of solidarity among
States belonging to an ever-closer union (Thieleman, 2002). The solidarity
principle roots collective action in the EU and its disrespect might have serious
consequences on the achievement of EU objectives. In sum, the result of the
competitive game is an “all losers” one.
Section 2. Suboptimal rules
Regulatory competition theorists use a second criterion to evaluate the result of
competition: the quality of the rules enacted. Charny (1991) for example makes
the point that managers will choose to incorporate in the State where the
corporation laws are more efficient. In his view, if Delaware was able to surpass
its competitors in attracting incorporations it was because the state adopted
optimal - not lax - rules. Romano (1985) agrees that the market for incorporation
creates an incentive for each State to enact the most efficient laws, i.e. Delaware
won the race because it offered comprehensive statutes and case law, as well as
an experienced judiciary specialised in corporate matters. It was also highly
responsive to the need for legal innovation insofar as it quickly reacted to legal
controversies, by adopting new precedent, new rules. Finally it granted stability
and serviceability in the system.
In contrast to the incorporation regulatory competition, the competition
among asylum laws was not conducive to the emergence of efficient and good
rules. The rules enacted raise questions of legality and legitimacy (§1) and have
proven to be inefficient (§2).
§1. The ‘efficiency versus legality’ dilemma
Describing the evolution of the international asylum regime, Crepeau (1997, p,
264) argues that member States had to face a liberal critique but at the same time
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constantly prove their efficiency in the implementation of their legislation. As
States were mainly concerned by the efficiency of their deflection policy during
the competitive process, they implemented rules, whose legitimacy or whose
compliance with international norms is arguable. For instance, important
criticisms have been aimed at the questionable compatibility of carriers’ liability
mechanisms with international norms. The legislative provisions organizing
carrier sanctions have been justified with reference to the obligations set out by
article 13 of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Aviation, which
requires that airline passengers comply with the entry formalities of the country
of destination. But the Chicago Convention does not impose a legal duty on the
airlines (operator) to enforce such compliance by passengers. Compliance with
Article 31 of the Geneva Convention has also been questioned. This provision
states that the Contracting States shall not impose penalties, “on account of their
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened, enter or are present in their territory
without authorization.” As the Council of Europe has frequently pointed out
17,
the national laws implementing the carriers’ liability rule fail to conform to the
spirit of the Convention.
The use of safe country and manifestly unfounded applications
mechanisms is also problematic
18. Their implementation corresponds to a
minimalist interpretation of the Convention. It contradicts a general principle of
interpretation of human rights norms which requires an open, liberal and
teleological interpretation that affords the greatest protection of the dignity of
victims (See Crepeau 1997, p. 265). The UNHCR adds that the so-called
unfounded applications are hastily examined by police forces at the border,
without any form of legal guarantees or judicial control
19. A third question arises
out of the establishment of transit or international zones. Whether it be officially
or simply in practice, some States have considered that these zones are not part
of their national territory thereby justifying the non-application of their legal
norms in these areas. But the UNHCR (1997) denounces the use of these zones,
which serve to mask the turning back of numerous potential refugees as a breach
of article 33 of the Geneva Convention.
The pursuit of efficiency in deflection also led States to enact measures
that raise questions of national legality. Scholars (See Jeannin et al p. 239)
document the increasing powers given to authorities who come under the
                                                         
17 See Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation, No. 1163(1991)
18 The UNHCR frequently calls attention to the fact that the examination of so-called
manifestly unfounded applications is expeditious, processed by police forces at the borderline
or immediately after entry without real guarantees offered to the person.
19 Executive Committee, conclusion No. 30/XXXIV on refugees status and abusive or
manifestly unfounded applications, UNHCR, Geneva20
Executive branch and whose actions, in practice, are not challenged before
courts. The UNHCR (1997) also denounces the expeditious examination of
asylum applications which violates national law. Soft law such as interpretative
rules significantly influences the behaviour of authorities but escapes judicial
monitoring. In addition, legal problems arise when migration controls – which
have a direct impact on asylum seekers’ situation – are exercised by incompetent
authorities. The carriers’ contribution towards border controls is an arguable
privatisation of States’ competence (See Crepeau, 1997;  Jeannin, 1999).
This general evolution suggests that efficiency in deflection has turned
out to be the unique criterion used – although there are many others - to evaluate
what is « good law ». Compliance with international norms, the legitimacy or
the coherence of national legal orders were cast off as useful criteria in the
assessment of the validity of competing measures. Yet, legitimacy was a much
discussed issue in States like Germany where the right to asylum was
incorporated into the Constitution in the aim of limiting the executive power
after the experience of the totalitarian nazi State. Therefore, unsurprisingly,
when efficiency-oriented measures have been challenged before national
courts
20, they have become politically costly for governments, who have had to
face both international and national critiques.
§2. Inefficient rules 
Although States were preoccupied with efficiency, i.e. the competitiveness of
their restrictive legislation, the rules implemented during the 80’s and 90’s did
not achieve their objective. The instruments used (the enactment of restrictive
procedures) proved to be inefficient in attaining the States’ goal (to get as few
refugees as possible).
First of all, while the array of restrictive measures may have slowed the
inflow of asylum seekers it failed to stop it and did not adequately regulate
migration flows. Second of all, the rules enacted produced side effects. The
UNHCR stresses the growth of human trafficking that results from restrictive
procedures. It indicates that the restrictive asylum practices introduced “have
converted what was a relatively visible and quantifiable flow of asylum seekers
into a covert movement of irregular migrants that is even more difficult for
States to count and control” (UNHCR, 1997, p. 199). Sociological studies also
                                                         
20 In December 1996, the French Conseil d’Etat in its decision Ministre de l’Interieur c/
Rogers, refused to consider as manifestly unfounded Mr Rogers’ asylum application on the
simple ground that, before entering the French national territory, he had transited by a State
signatory of the Geneva Convention. (CE, Ass., 18 décembre 1996, Ministre de l’intérieur c/
M. Rogers, n 180856, conclusions M. Delarue).  The French Conseil constitutionnel in its
February 25
th, 1992 decision  limited the possibility to use the transit zones.
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show that irregular movements are increasingly arranged and carried out by
professional traffickers. Chatelard (2002) shows that keeping asylum seekers out
has had the side effect of allowing for the development of networks of migrant
smugglers (See also Salt and Hogarth, 2000 and Ghosh, 1998). Accordingly, to
avoid being returned to the safe third countries by which they have transited,
many asylum seekers destroy their identity documents and passports or lie when
they describe their migration route. The restrictive measures have thus driven
migration underground. As a result, States are obliged to forever reinforce
procedures and draw on more and more human resources to fight against
smuggling networks and abuse of the asylum system, which in turn constitutes
significant indirect costs of bureaucracy. A second illustration of a costly side
effect concerns the right to work. In order to dissuade asylum seekers from
coming, States have decided to withdraw the right to work previously granted.
The consequence is that many asylum seekers remain a considerable burden, as
States are obliged to provide subsidies in order to compensate for the subsequent
loss of earnings. The limited protection conferred upon asylum seekers tends to
disempower them and hamper their contribution to host societies, thus
exacerbating hostile perceptions of them by the latter (Joly, p. 347).
The conclusion is that regulatory competition has turned out to be
negative. It has been costly, inefficient with no limit to the spiral of restrictions
and to the increase in costs. Constitutions have not been able to serve as
bulwarks, setting down the rules of the game insofar as they have been
amended. Yet, arguably potential rules of the game already exist and can be
found in international law. States have tried to get around the Geneva provisions
or have interpreted them restrictively. But they have avoided direct infringement
of the Convention. Therefore, one may wonder whether, in the frame of this
regulatory competition process, international law is not the ultimate limit.
Insofar as international law is a binding rule collectively agreed upon, it could
delimit the playing field by indicating what constitutes fair competition. This
suggests that international cooperation is susceptible to regulate competition and
avoid the race to the bottom.
PART IV- ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES TO NEGATIVE
REGULATORY COMPETITION?
What kind of response is needed to avoid market failure and eliminate the
negative effects of competition? Revesz (2002), who analyses competition
among environmental rules in Europe, suggests two possible responses to
negative regulatory competition among member States. First of all, the member
States can agree to a bilateral, legally enforceable treaty which will produce the
optimal result. In such a treaty, States can adopt optimal, stringent standards
thereby maximising social welfare. Then, if a State is seen to cut its social22
standards, the other Member States will impose sanctions on it. The second
response is the adoption of a comprehensive federal legislation in order to
eliminate the undesirable effects of the race. Centralised action is promoted
because, if federal legislation adopts optimal standards acceptable for all States,
the States would be precluded from competing for industries or incorporations
by introducing lax regulations. The expected result is the maximisation of
collective welfare.
The first strategy of cooperation was followed during the 80’s and 90’s
but it was inefficient (Section 1). Is centralised action (i.e. action at the federal
level) the solution ? I will show that despite the transfer of competence to the
EU, “centralised action” in the field of asylum is unlikely at the present time to
transform competitive and unilateral behaviour into collective action leading to
an optimal regulation. I therefore propose to explore Esty and Gerardin’s idea of
« co-opetition » (Section 2).
Section 1. Limited spontaneous cooperation among member States:
cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition
EU member States have established legal norms aimed at collectively tackling
the asylum dilemma (§1). But despite important efforts, the result of this
spontaneous cooperation is unsatisfactory. This failure can be explained by the
idea that cooperation took place in the shadow of competition (§2).
§1. Initiated cooperation
Since the mid-80’s, EU member States started negotiating international
agreements dealing with asylum. They pursued two main strategies, which were
assumed to eliminate competition among asylum laws.
The first move towards a collective limitation of the competitive process
was the signature of the Schengen Convention and the Dublin Convention
determining the State responsible for examining application lodged in one
member State of the EC
21 (entered into force in 1997). I propose to analyse the
Dublin Convention as a collective action that aims at impeding asylum
shoppers’ mobility and thus the opportunity to exercise regulatory arbitrage.
Indeed the Dublin convention’s purpose is to set up mechanisms ensuring that
each asylum application lodged in the EU will be processed by one Member
State (and only one). The Convention has laid down six hierarchically ordered
criteria that serve to determine which member State is to be held responsible for
                                                         
21 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged
in one of the Member States of the European Communities – Dublin Convention, OJ C 254,
19.08. 1997, p. 1.
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processing the application: family-bond criterion; the issue of a residence
permit; the possession of a valid visa; illegal entry; the permission to enter
without a visa; first application for asylum. The mechanism prevents asylum
shopping for two reasons. First, asylum seekers can no longer initiate parallel or
successive applications in several member States. Only one State is competent to
process their examination. Second of all, the Dublin system transforms the
asylum seekers’ opportunity to choose his/her destination country into a legal
State-oriented determination. For instance, an asylum seeker wishing to claim
asylum in the U.K. but entering illegally the EU via the French territory will not
be allowed to reach the U.K.: the French authorities will be deemed competent
for the examination of the claim. As a result of the Dublin Convention the
“freedom” to exercise asylum shopping is absorbed by an institutionalised and
interventionist mechanism of distribution of asylum seekers among member
States. As it prevents regulatory arbitrage, the Dublin Convention was supposed
to hinder the development of regulatory competition.
Exactly at the same period, member States started negotiating burden
sharing schemes. It is a different strategy insofar as it purports to replace the
previous unilateral and competitive actions that deflect asylum seekers in
sharing out the costs and resources of refugee protection. In 1992, a Common
position was adopted that referred to burden sharing in order to ensure a just and
lasting solution for people fleeing the Yugoslav war. After the treaty of
Maastricht and within the framework of third pillar mechanisms, Member States
adopted various measures trying to establish burden sharing plans. In September
1995, the Council adopted a resolution on the allocation of responsibility among
member States
22. In 1996, a Decision was enacted laying down an alert and
emergency procedure on burden sharing with regard to the admission and
residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis
23. Main refugee receivers, in
particular Germany and Sweden supported these norms. From the early 90’s
onwards, these two countries have systematically proposed and promoted
burden sharing plans (Swedish proposal on burden sharing in November 1993;
German draft Council Resolution on burden sharing with regard to the
admission and residence of refugees of July 1994). This action in favour of
burden-sharing must not be misunderstood as a strategy designed by over-
burdened States to rid themselves of an excessively large number of protection
seekers. It should be viewed, instead, as a means to maintain and restore States’
admission capacities in the long term (Hailbronner, 2000). As a matter of fact,
burden sharing plans in the field of asylum reveal a political will to foster
solidarity and equitable distribution among States belonging to an ever closer
Union. As burden sharing projects help States to increase or maintain the
protection granted to asylum seekers and ensure greater justice to asylum
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seekers, they represent an attempt to move away from the logic of regulatory
competition.
§2. Failed cooperation
The results of these different instruments of cooperation are however negligible.
Some scholars argue that their main interest is in that member States have
benefited from acting collectively to achieve migration-related objectives
without having had to cede their authority to the Community (Thouez, p. 1).
Other scholars argue that States have used common norms to legitimise at the
national level the shift towards restrictive asylum legislation. For instance, the
Dublin Convention and the 1992 London resolution
24 allow States to return an
asylum seeker to a third country even when the criteria point to one of the
States’ responsibility for processing the case
25. Vink concludes that governments
have pursued restrictive policies that are perhaps not all that different from those
that they would have pursued in the absence of European cooperation, but they
could get away with it more easily by strategically profiting from the European
playing field. This is especially true of frontrunner countries such as the
Netherlands or Germany, who could then try to shift the blame to Europe for
being too harsh. (Vink, 2001; Guiraudon, 2000).
Be that as it may, the 90’s’ cooperation has failed to stop regulatory
competition. The Dublin convention has not eliminated asylum shopping and is
criticised for having created significant side effects such as lengthy procedures,
unclear criteria, the fact that few asylum seekers are ultimately transferred from
one country to another, longer periods of uncertainty (See Liebaut, 2002). More
important is the view that the Dublin Convention has incited asylum seekers to
destroy identity and travel documents, and has generated a strategy of
clandestine entry and residence in order to avoid the transfer from one member
State to another.  Some asylum seekers have also decided to withdraw their
asylum application in order to avoid the application of the Dublin Convention,
preferring access to a more limited form of protection. Last and mainly, asylum
seekers have developed new strategies in order to continue to be able to choose
their destination State. Informed of the Dublin criteria (especially the fourth, i.e.
illegal entry), some protection seekers have avoided the official procedure of
acquiring a visa or residence permits and choose to enter illegally onto the
territory of their destination State. Despite States’ efforts and coordination,
asylum seekers have pursued their strategy of asylum shopping.
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The burden sharing projects have not produced better results. The 1995
resolution and the 1996 decision have not created any common rule concerning
admission, return, rights granted to displaced persons etc. As a consequence, the
content of national legislation has not been approximated and differences among
laws fuel regulatory arbitrage. In the early 90’s, States considered the possibility
to organise people-sharing mechanisms, i.e. mandatory allocation systems of
asylum seekers among member States. The 1994 German draft proposed to
assign protection seekers with a distributive key based on member States’
percentage of the total Union population, percentage of the Union’s territory and
percentage of the Gross domestic product of the Union. Moreover, this
mandatory system denied asylum seekers the freedom to choose the protecting
State. But strong reservations from France and the UK watered down the
project. As a result, a very light system has been set out: the 1995 decision on
alert and emergency procedure abandoned the system of allocation of people.
Logically, the imbalance of burden among member States was not
reduced during the 90’s. All data confirm the unevenness in the distribution of
protection seekers in Europe, both for refugees and for temporary protection
seekers during the Yugoslav crisis (the UNHCR, 1999). Moreover the Dublin
mechanism has produced concentration effects (Lavenex,  Noll). By application
of the entry criterion, States in geographical proximity to crisis regions are
deemed primarily responsible and risk being overburdened. By application of
the family criterion, the Dublin convention increases the burden of States
already hosting large communities of migrants. Hailbronner (p. 401) concludes
rightly that the Schengen and Dublin conventions have established a special type
of burden shifting rather than burden sharing.
In sum, despite important efforts to cooperate, there was no shift from
costly and unilateral asylum policies towards fairer and more efficient collective
action. States promoting cooperation schemes have been permanently
constrained by the risk of being undercut by competing States. While the
majority of member States had an interest and incentive to cooperate (Barbou
des Places; 2002), the potential benefit of pursuing competition by individual
action was still promising. Noll explains this situation by the prisoner’s dilemma
metaphor that describes the impossibility to cooperate in public goods theory
(Noll, 1997). He notices that the spiral of restriction recalls the prisoner’s
dilemma in which two parties try to save themselves through unilateral action
rather than accepting the costs which accompany the benefits of cooperation.
Suhrke underlines the fact that States still had enough manoeuvring room to
insulate themselves from asylum seekers flows (Suhrke, 1998) insofar as
unilaterally, each State retained the legal capacity to bar entries. Therefore,
States conferring on asylum seekers a more limited legal protection could still
expect to win the competitive process by pursuing restrictive policies. Only high26
refugee receivers had an interest to promote cooperation and burden sharing. But
given that decisions were either based on voluntarism (international
conventions) or on the unanimity rule, cooperation was unlikely. Cooperation
could not emerge from the shadow of regulatory competition: logically the 90’s
were characterised by the evident predominance of competition.
Section 2. Conditions for an efficient federal  regulation?
Federal action is traditionally presented as the alternative to negative
competition when spontaneous cooperation does not emerge or does not produce
efficient regulation. The first benefit of a centralised action are the economies of
scale which may be created by establishing a single, uniform set of rules that
govern various types of transactions. The need for multiple governments to
produce the same legislation is reduced. A second benefit comes from the fact
that central government can provide more of the relevant public good at less cost
because it reduces the costs that stem from regulatory arbitrage : evasion, forum
shopping, externalisation. Thirdly, centralised action is also justifiable from the
perspective of distributive – as opposed to allocative - efficiency.
The issue that must be raised now is whether the communautarisation of
the competence to act in the field of asylum will permit the emergence of a
federal and centralised regulation able to change the nature of the game (from
competition to cooperation) and its outcome?
§1. Competition in the loopholes of federal regulation
As it gives competence to the EC to regulate migration and asylum issues, the
Treaty of Amsterdam could theoretically allow for the adoption of a
comprehensive and efficient asylum legislation. Article 63(1) EC has given
competence to the Council EC to adopt minimum standards for the reception of
asylum seekers in Member States, minimum standards with respect to the
qualification of third country Nationals as refugees, and minimum standards for
the procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status.
The end of the intergovernmental approach is a major change, together
with the Council’s obligation to act within a five year time limit. Following an
optimistic scenario, the harmonisation process, by suppressing differences in
legislation, should limit regulatory arbitrage and therefore could avoid the race
in protection restriction. Harmonisation is likely to ensure fair protection to
asylum seekers and eliminate costs related to constant legislation amendments.
Moreover, the action undertaken by European institutions could eliminate the
externalities problems and would limit transactions costs for law consumers and
regulatees. In accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, States have accepted to
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complement the harmonisation process by the establishment of burden sharing
mechanisms (Art. 63(2)b). Therefore it is possible that, if burdened States can
expect assistance from their partners in the form of people-sharing or fiscal
sharing mechanisms, they will maintain or increase their acceptance of
protection seekers. Likewise, they could be incited to accept protective
harmonised norms. Therefore, the treaty of Amsterdam opens up the way for a
first scenario: the replacement of competition by harmonisation driven by a
central authority and the revitalisation of States’ commitment to the Geneva
Convention through Community measures.
But centralisation, i.e. comprehensive State regulation in the EU, poses
also many problems. Centralisation needs to be made compatible with the
subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity principle imposes the respect of national
diversity in asylum policy, insofar as the level of protection to be granted is to
be decided at the national level only. Therefore, the difficulty is the following:
because central government is supposed to produce legislation which applies to
a large number of States, chances are that legislation produced at the central
level will represent only the lowest common denominator upon which all States
can agree, especially if unanimous voting is the rule. The problem is that a
minimal common rule cannot eliminate differences in regulation thus the floor
remains open to regulatory arbitrage and competition because of the loopholes
in federal regulation. Unless the harmonisation norm is comprehensive,
competition remains the most plausible scenario.
Indeed the current debates on the future European asylum policy reveal
that many States still rely on a competitive strategy in order to avoid new costs
and are not promoting a comprehensive and protective European asylum policy.
Only a very limited harmonisation, offering a low level of protection to asylum
seekers, is, for the moment, to be expected and this despite the Commission’s
efforts to promote decent protection of refugees. Moreover, in the absence of
norms guaranteeing real burden sharing insurance (Article 63 EC exempts
burden sharing measures from the five year time limit), it can be assumed that “a
rational State will opt for a minimum level of protection” (Noll). States will not
promote mandatory high (and costly) standards of protection without receiving
any guarantee that the others will share the reception efforts. The decision
creating the European Refugee Fund
26, which symbolises a political will to
ensure financial compensation for overburdened States, will not suffice to offer
real insurance and predictability for main receiving countries. Its budget is too
limited to cover care and maintenance costs induced by refugee protection.
Because norm sharing (i.e. harmonisation) and fiscal and people sharing can not
be separated, it ensues from all of the above that minimum harmonisation is
                                                         
26 Council Decision of September 28
th, 2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund, 2000/596
OJ L 252/12, 6.10.2000.28
highly probable (Barbou des Places, 2002) and that cooperation, even promoted
at the central level, is unlikely to replace regulatory competition.
It seems therefore that the ‘competition versus centralisation’ debate is
too simplistic for the EU. In Europe, central or federal regulation is EC law, i.e.
norms enacted under the Member States’ control. The enactment of an EC rule
must take into account the variety of national interets, benefits and strategies.
The adoption of a European norm can not be analysed as an alternative to
competition insofar as the creation of a European norm itself results from both
cooperation and political competition among member States.
§2. Co-ompetition
The correct approach must not rely on the replacement of competition by
centralisation. States’ incentives to compete or free ride by lowering standards
of protection will not disappear simply because States also negotiate common
rules at the EU level. Rather, the situation points to a solution that combines
«  tamed  » competition and cooperation. Esty and Gerardin  (2002) offer an
interesting analysis. They argue that regulatory theory should reflect and parallel
the world’s diversity and complexity. As regulatory competition corresponds to
horizontally arrayed jurisdictions, it represents only one of the forms of pressure
that disciplines State actors and drive governmental efficiency. In their view,
optimal governance requires a flexible mix of a variety of different types of
competition. Only multidimensional competition (States versus federation;
States versus States, government decision makers versus non-governmental
organisations), combined with cooperation, is likely to enhance regulatory
effectiveness and efficiency. They call this regulatory approach: «  co-
opetition ».
Their model suggests going beyond the regulatory competition versus
cooperation debate and points in the direction of the path taken by current works
on European good governance. The Commission has recently enacted a
communication that promotes the use of the ‘open method of coordination’
(OMC) in the field of migration and asylum
27. The OMC is aimed at
complementing the top-bottom enactment of legislative measures and favours
open and public discussions among States, the Commission, and other actors
such as the European parliament and NGOs. The OMC purports to enhance
public discussion in an institutionalised political arena, and promotes the
discovery and transfer of “best practice” among member States.
                                                         
27 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on an
Open Method of Coordination for the Community immigration policy, COM (2001) 0387
final.
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Two elements must be stressed that might bring about a change. First of
all, because the OMC on principle obliges States to politically and publicly
justify their actions, one can legitimately expect that States which adopt
unilateral, selfish and externalising measures will be politically and publicly
blamed. In the field of asylum, the enactment of restrictive legislation shifting
the burden to other competitors would be politically costly for States. As a
consequence, States desirous of avoiding public ‘shame’ and wishing to protect
their good reputation could be incited, when they enact a new law, to take into
consideration the possible effects of their legislation on their partners-
competitors. Hence the OMC could tame the horizontal competition among
States.
Second of all, the OMC could represent a move away from the previous
inter-State game insofar as it promotes the consultation of civil society, and
includes NGOs in the debate. Its interest lies in that it multiplies the number of
actors involved. The presence of numerous actors is indeed essential in the field
of asylum as the first concerned, i.e. asylum seekers, cannot influence the
content of the laws enacted. They can select a destination State but they cannot
oppose the adoption or enforcement of restrictive national laws. This is one of
the main differences with the Delaware model in which shareholders can resist
incorporation decisions advocated by managers. Because shareholders can
decide to impede a relocation that does not match their preferences, one can
expect companies to relocate in states offering an optimal combination of norms
enhancing shareholders’ and managers’ welfare. It is the competition between
these two kinds of actors that generates a compromise on the decision to relocate
a decision that influences the evolution of the States’ legislation. In the field of
asylum, there is no such competition between countervailing forces. Hence the
importance of involving institutions such as the UNHCR or NGOs in the debate,
to ensure a more comprehensive debate. Because NGOs might exert pressure on
regulators, this situation resembles the «  extra-governmental regulatory co-
opetition » praised by Esty and Gerardin.  They use this term in referring to the
dynamics of competition and cooperation taking place between governmental
and non-governmental actors. This form of co-opetition promises to heighten
governmental performance by unleashing NGOs who then become intellectual
competitors in the policy-making domain. Indeed the authors consider that in
many cases, NGOs are better positioned to compete with regulators than are
other government officials. As NGOs are swift to pick up new issues and
operate in a fiercely competitive market place for media and public attention,
their pressure can create a strong incentive to come up with creative solutions.
Can we seriously expect that the OMC, if effectively put into practice,
could put an end to the restrictive spiral in refugee protection? The answer is
probably negative. Yet, it is certainly the combination of institutionalised and30
framed competition and cooperation that could permit the elaboration of a non
regressive European asylum policy. It is only on this condition that Reich’s
analysis (1992) can be borne out. He argues that the enactment of minimum
harmonisation measures, which complies with the subsidiarity principle, can
generate a competition for “better rules”. His idea is that EC law would form the
starting point for a competition between legal orders, by establishing a common
parameter, that could   then allow for different choices by people living in
different jurisdictions. By placing limits on competition, harmonisation can aim
to preserve the autonomy and diversity of national legal systems, while at the
same time seek to ‘steer’ the channel of the process of evolutionary adaptation
of rules at the State level. Therefore one can expect that the directives which set
out minimum standards will create a floor of rights from which member States
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